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POST-PINOCHET CHILE AND DECREE LAW 600
(OR, HOW TO MAKE A DEVELOPING ECONOMY SIZZLE!)
RICHARD SCOTT, JUDITH SCOTT, DEBORA GILLIARD, AND NORM PENCE
METROPOLITAN STATE COLLEGE OF DENVER

I. INTRODUCTION
Geographically, Chile is remote from most of the world as it lies on the western edge
of South America away from the world's heavily traveled air and sea routes. Although
it is not on major thoroughfares Chile has the look of a ribbon of land B long and
narrow B that stretches more than 2,500 miles between Peru to the north, the Pacific
to the west, Argentina and the Andes mountains to the east, and Antarctica to the
south and at its narrowest point, the country's width is only 56 miles.
It wasn't long ago that Chile was a political basket-case. A decade ago it could have
been correctly described as the land of the unfree and the home of the coup. That's
because of the political turbulence the country experienced for two decades, from
1970 until 1990. The genesis of this turbulence lies within Chilean history and its
determination to promote economic growth while trying to cure some of its major
social problems, especially the issue of income distribution and the elimination of
social class structures. By 1970, many Chileans were convinced that socialism could
solve many social problems without adversely affecting the country's economic
growth. That conviction allowed Salvador Allende to become the first freely elected
Marxist president in the world. But after experiencing Allende in the presidential
palace, many Chileans came to the conclusion that his policies were too radical.
Moreover, having a Marxist lead the country was tilting Chile toward the Soviet camp
whereas tradition and the Monroe Doctrine place the country squarely under the
American tent. In 1972, after only two years of Allende governing the country, Chile
faced widespread economic, political and social problems that had not existed before.
Because of the chaos emanating from those problems, General Augusto Pinochet
Ugarte led a military coup in 1973 that ended Allende's socialist government.
After coming to power the Pinochet military dictatorship determined that
authoritarianism was better than liberal democracy, and backed by the military, he
ruled by presidential decree. In 1988, feeling confident that he then had earned the
support of a majority of Chileans, Pinochet permitted a plebiscite to determine if he
should continue in power or allow free elections. Pinochet was surprised that he lost
the plebiscite (according to Frohmann (1998) the vote tally was 53% for a democratic
system and 44% for a continuation of military rule) but he did follow through on his
promise and called for elections. In the elections Pinochet's choice for president was
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defeated by the centrist-left candidate, Patricio Aylwin Azocar. Aylwin took office in
1990 as the first elected president since 1970.
Although he was in power as a military usurper of the democratic process for
seventeen years and whose administration was allegedly responsible for gross human
rights abuses, including the kidnapping and murder of unknown numbers of Chilean
citizens, on the economic front Pinochet can be credited with building a successful
and productive economy. Aylwin built on that strong base with innovative programs,
facilitating Chile's development as one of the most prosperous Latin American
countries. Aylwin did not run for reelection in 1993 but supported Eduardo Frei RuizTagle, who took office in March 1994. According to Aguero (1998) the major
difference between the Aylwin and Frei governments was that Aylwin's
administration was focused on securing the stability of Chile's new democracy while
Frei's administration is concentrating on pragmatic and ambitious development goals.
Socially, Chile has undergone major changes since 1970. These social developments
are reflected in key indicators including life expectancy at birth, infant mortality,
malnutrition, educational attainment, and overall literacy are more in line with higher
income countries than the developing world. By the late-1990s, only about one-fourth
of Chile's people live below the poverty line compared to almost half in the mid1980s (The World Bank Group, 1996). Importantly, the Frei administration has made
education a top priority and that may bode well for the future and the elimination of
the disparity in income distribution -- data for more than twenty-five years still shows
that Chile is far from attaining the income equity levels found in developed countries,
even lagging behind countries such as South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong although
it does exceed the distribution levels of Mexico and Brazil (Diaz, 1997).
Economically, although it is relatively remote -- not on the world's most traveled
pathways -- Chile is one of the world's most dynamic and promising markets for its
size. However, its strength and attractiveness lie not in its size -- its population is only
14 million -- but in the energy of its entrepreneurs, the transparency of its regulations,
and the predictability of its decision -makers (U.S. Embassy Santiago, 1996). This
new economic vitality contrasts sharply with the period from the 1930s until the early1970s, when the Chilean economy was one of the most heavily state-oriented
economies in the world, with huge government subsidies which led to very inefficient
industrial and agricultural sectors (Drope, 1997). Today, however, the Frei
government has earned laudatory comments such as the one that maintained that Chile
is one of Athe best-managed economies in the world [causing it to have] the highest
economic growth rate in Latin America@ (Nexus, 1999).
Pinochet's uplifting of the Chilean economy contradicts Dominguez' (1997) assertion
that Latin American economies collapsed when military presidents governed because
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the military is incompetent outside of its specific professional sphere. Pinochet
showed competence in dealing with economic problems and his non-military
successors have followed his lead. These initiatives have caused Chile to experience a
relatively low inflation rate (3.8%) (LatinTrade, 1999), the largest growth in gross
domestic product (GDP) in Latin America since 1991 averaging just over 7% (UN
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, 1997) and is forecasted
to experience the largest positive real GDP change in Latin America for the year 2000
(LatinTrade, 1999).
II. ROLE OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is viewed as a major stimulus to economic growth in
developing countries. That's because it springs from an exogenous source and creates
economic opportunity and activity that would otherwise not be present in a economy.
Increases in FDI helps countries deal with two major obstacles that impede further
development, namely, shortages of financial resources and technology and skills.
Because FDI brings monies and opportunities into an economy it is viewed as a
positive input for policy-makers in developing countries in particular B but even
officials of the largest economies welcome FDI as a positive economic input.
III. THE ACHICAGO BOYS@ AND CHILEAN ECONOMIC
LIBERALIZATION
As discussed above, FDI plays an important role in stimulating a country's economy.
Hojman (1996) maintains that early in the Pinochet era, the expression AChicago
Boys@ was coined to refer to those economists who recommended and implemented
the liberalization and stabilization policies of the military government. Hojman states
that the term was meant to be pejorative. Originally it was based on the theoretical
guidance of Milton Friedman and other University of Chicago economists derived
from a long-standing association between the University of Chicago and the Catholic
University in Santiago. Hojman reasons that the most pragmatic economic policies
instituted by Pinochet were mainly rooted more in Chilean history than on the ties to
the AChicago Boys.@ Regardless where the policies were conceived, they seemed to
have worked for Chile. Pinochet apparently understood the role of FDI and sought
ways to increase it. Thus, the rules surrounding FDI were liberalized in 1974 under
the banner, Decree Law 600 (Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean, 1997). According to the Canadian Pro Business Connections (1996) Chile
is Aone" of the most outstanding examples of how . . .foreign investments can
generate economic growth in Latin America. Considered a pioneer in the region, the
country is committed to . . .[encouraging] foreign investment.
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IV. MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING COUNTRIES TARGETED FOR
INCREASED FDI
According to the International Finance Corporation (1998), Fortune 1000 company
executives are almost unanimous in the view that the first step to increasing levels of
foreign direct investment is for host countries to order their economic and political
affairs. Thus, it stands to reason that as investor corporations and individuals start
creating lists of possible FDI countries the economic and political stability of a
country will determine in large measure whether it appears on the list. Moreover, it
can be argued that countries that put themselves in contention for greater levels of
FDI, are also better able to utilize the associated benefits arriving with the
investments.
It stands to reason that investors looking for repositories for their investment monies
would seek out countries which, first, welcome their investments and, second, will
protect them. Chile has accomplished these major requirements by:
•
•
•
•

passing a liberalized foreign direct investment law;
focusing on economic freedom;
enhancing investor confidence while reducing investor risk; and,
reducing official corruption.

In the following sections, each of the above factors will be discussed, in turn, as they
pertain to Chile.
V. PASSING A LIBERALIZED FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT LAW
(D.L. 600)
According to the Office of the U.S. International Trade Representative (1995), AChile
officially welcomes foreign investment.@ This welcoming attitude is embodied in the
country's foreign investment law, known as D.L. (for Decree Law) 600. The law was
first established in 1974 by General Pinochet and has been liberalized, both by the
military regime and the civilian governments that have followed. At this time, nearly
all foreign direct investment in Chile takes place through D.L. 600. While the law
requires that foreign investment must be approved by a government committee,
approval procedures are considered expeditious and not difficult to comply with.
According to the Country Commercial Guide for Chile published by the U.S.
Embassy Santiago (1998), applications are typically Aapproved" within a matter of
days, and almost always within one month.@ [As an aside B the Chilean Foreign
Investment Committee publishes its Foreign Investment Application and it can be
located on the Internet at http://www.sea-world.com/prochile/index.en(8).html. The
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application is extremely simple and the instructions are only slightly over a page in
length.]
According to the Chilean Commercial Guide published by the U.S. Embassy in
Santiago, the provisions of D.L. 600 allow investors to have a contract between the
investor and the Government of Chile. The procedure is for the investor to complete
the Foreign Investment mentioned in the paragraph above, and after approval is
granted by the Chilean Foreign Investment Committee, the investor signs a
standardized contract issued by the Chilean Foreign Investment Committee. The
contract gives the investors the right:
•
•
•
•
•
•

to receive non-discriminatory treatment;
to participate in any form of investment;
to hold assets indefinitely;
to remit or reinvest earnings immediately and remit capital after one year;
to opt for either national tax treatment or a guaranteed rate for the first ten years
of an investment; and,
to acquire foreign currency at the inter-bank rate of exchange.

With respect to the effectiveness of D.L. 600, the proof is in the statistics. Appendix 1
details the inflow of FDI into Chile from 1974 thru 1996.
V. FOCUSING ON ECONOMIC FREEDOM -- INDEX OF ECONOMIC
FREEDOM
Evidence that D.L. 600 is working can be found in the Heritage Foundation/Wall
Street Journal 2000 Index of Economic Freedom. This index measures how well 161
countries scored on a list of 50 independent variables that were divided into 10 broad
factors of economic freedom. The higher the score on a factor, the greater the level of
government interference in the economy and the less economic freedom in a country.
These ten factors are:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Trade policy;
Fiscal burden of government;
Government intervention in the economy;
Monetary policy;
Capital flows and foreign investment;
Banking;
Wages and prices;
Property rights;
Regulation; and,
Black markets.
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The Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal then publishes the results of its ranking.
For the year 2000 the index was authored by Gerald P. O'Driscoll, Jr., Kim R.
Holmes, and Melanie Kirkpatrick under the title, 2000 Index of Economic Freedom in
an Index of Global Economic Freedom. Out of 161 countries ranked in the 2000
index, Chile was ranked eleventh in the world and has the freest economy in Latin
America. An abbreviated world ranking of the top-ranked fifteen countries and the
bottom-ranked fifteen countries is included as Appendix 2.
VII. ENHANCING INVESTOR CONFIDENCE WHILE REDUCING
INVESTOR RISK
In order to consider a country as a target for increased FDI, investors must have
confidence in the country and risk factors must be taken into consideration. In that
light a recent study by the European Roundtable of Industrialists (ERT) and reported
by the International Finance Corporation (1998) gives evidence of rising investor
confidence in Chile. The ERT analyzed Latin American FDI and cost-related barriers
to investment in seven of the region's countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia,
Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela. The study also compares the Latin American results
with findings from a similar study of ten countries in Asia (China, Hong Kong, India,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand).
Notably, FDI in Latin America as a whole demonstrated a more favorable
environment for investment than those of their Asian counterparts. Interestingly, for a
total of seventeen countries compared in the study -- seven from Latin America and
ten from Asia -- Chile was found to be the country whose FDI barriers were the
lowest. The ERT Survey results are shown as Appendix 3.
With respect to investment risk, two international publications, Euromoney and
Institutional Investor, publishes rankings of an individual country's creditworthiness.
Both ranks have similar objectives, namely providing estimates of the likelihood that
a sovereign borrower will default on its debt. Interestingly, an article appearing in the
International Journal of Commerce and Management (Ivanova, Arcelus & Srivivasan,
1998) reports that of nineteen Latin American countries ranked, Chile was ranked as
having the lowest investment risk by both Euromoney and Institutional Investor. The
Economist Intelligence Unit, a sister company of The Economist, devised a country
risk rating for the year 2000. A country's overall score takes into account 77 different
indicators that reflect such factors as political stability, quality of governance,
monetary and fiscal policy, regulatory policy, current-account balances, debt,
financial structure and liquidity risk. Political risk has a weight of 22% in the overall
score. A summary of the ratings were published by The Economist (November 13,
1999) and show that out of twenty-eight countries rated, Chile's level of risk was
twenty-sixth B that is, of the 28 countries ranked, Chile had the third lowest
investment risk.
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VIII. REDUCING OFFICIAL CORRUPTION
A new organization, Transparency International (TI), was established in 1993 to shine
a laser beam on the degree of corruptive practices -- such as bribery -- around the
world. With headquarters in Berlin, the non-governmental organization has published
comparative information that clearly depicts how nations stack up against one another
vis a vis corruption of its officialdom. Appendix 4 lists the rank ordering of ninetynine nations by TI. The rankings are derived from scores relating to perceptions of the
degree to which corruption exists within each ranked nation collected from
participating businesspeople, risk analysts, and the general public by a survey
instrument. Further, the index draws on surveys conducted by Gallup International,
McGraw Hill Global Risk Service and data gathered from Internet sources.
According to TI's Corruption Perception Index (CPI), the countries perceived to be the
least corrupt are given the highest scores out of ten. In the 1999 CPI (see Appendix 4)
only Denmark scored a perfect 10. Then, Finland, was ranked second. Cameroon, on
the other hand, was rank ordered at the bottom of the ninety-nine countries analyzed.
Interestingly, the U.S. was ranked in 18th place, just after Austria and just ahead of
Chile (Transparency International, 1999).
IX. CONCLUSIONS
Promulgated by the Pinochet military dictatorship, Decree Law 600 established a
policy of the free flow of foreign direct investment with no real barriers. In fact,
foreign investment is encouraged by providing a hospitable, stable, legal and
regulatory environment and practically all forms of business activity are permitted to
the foreign investor. Chile recognizes that foreign direct investment inflows enhances
an economy and has simplified the procedure for application, setting up new
businesses or acquiring existing ones. Chile has also made it simple for investors to
repatriate their capital and profits and has a tax system that is basically neutral B that
is, it is nearly identical to the tax systems in those countries where most foreign
investments originate. In essence, Chile's Decree Law 600 has transparent regulations
and provisions and provides for equal treatment between Chilean and foreign-owned
companies.

Given the foresight of the Pinochet military dictatorship and fine-tuned by successive
democratically-elected governments, Chile has become a major destination for foreign
investment from around the world. Thus, it is deriving the economic benefits from its
enlightened foreign direct investment policies. Rather than continuing to pursue
foreign direct investment incentives that tend to reduce the benefits derived from
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foreign investments, other developing countries should take a close look at Chile's
Decree Law 600 and ask themselves could they institute a similar law? If so, the
benefits B social, political and economic B could be enormous.
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Appendix 1
Foreign Direct Investment in Chile
(under D.L. 600, in thousands of US$)

1974 thru
1989

4,986,078

1990

1,320,345
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1991

980,568

1992

1,000,251

1993

1,715,467

1994

2,518,372

1995

3,043,115

1996

4,823,900

Source: Frohmann, Alicia. (1998). Structural changes in Chilean society, Chile in the
International Economy, edited by Carlos D. Martin y Carla Y. Buxeda, FLACSOChile and the Foreign Investment Committee.
Appendix 2
2000 Index of Economic Freedom Rankings
(top ranked 15 countries and bottom ranked 15 countries)
RANK COUNTRY
1 Hong Kong
2 Singapore
3 New Zealand
4 Bahrain
4 Luxembourg
4 United States
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7 Ireland
8 Australia
8 Switzerland
8 United Kingdom
11 Canada
11 Chile
11 El Salvador
11 Taiwan
15 Austria

............................

147 Azerbaijan
148 Guinea-Bissau
148 Turkmenistan
148 Vietnam
151 Bosnia
151 Uzbekistan
153 Angola
154 Iran
155 Laos
156 Congo, Dem. Rep.
Mountain Plains Journal of Business and Economics, Volume 1, 2000

79

157 Cuba
158 Somalia
159 Libya
160 Iraq
161 Korea, North
Source: O'Driscoll, Gerald P., Jr., Holmes, Kim R., & Kirkpatrick, Melanie. (2000).
2000 Index of Economic Freedom (New York: Heritage Foundation/The Wall Street
Journal), Executive Summary available on the Internet
at http://www.heritage.org/index/execsum.html.
Appendix 3
ERT Survey: Transaction Cost Related Barriers to FDI in Latin America
Barrier
Culture
Image
State Control
Transparency
Bureaucracy
Corruption
Lobbying
Local Capital
Markets
Distribution System
Telecommunication
s
Infrastructure
Overall Assessment

Argentin Brazi Chil Colombi Mexic Per Venezuel Latin
Asian
a
l
e
a
o
u
a
Americ Countrie
a
s
8.0
8.2 7.8
7.4
6.7 7.8
7.6
7.6
7.2
6.2
3.5 6.7
2.7
3.5 4.1
5.6
4.6
5.1
7.4
4.0 5.0
6.2
5.6 6.2
2.3
5.2
5.5
4.7
4.5 5.2
3.8
2.1 4.7
1.6
3.8
5.1
4.1
2.7 3.9
4.6
2.0 3.3
1.8
3.2
4.0
3.1
3.1 6.9
2.4
2.0 4.1
1.9
3.4
4.1
4.6
3.9 5.6
3.8
4.9 5.8
3.1
4.5
4.8
9.1
7.0 8.2
7.8
6.3 8.4
7.2
7.7
6.5
4.5
5.6

5.0
5.3

7.0
9.0

4.0
4.9

4.4
5.0

4.7
5.5

4.2
4.5

4.8
5.7

5.4
6.3

3.8
5.6

4.2
4.7

5.9
6.5

2.3
4.5

2.8
4.1

3.7
5.3

3.3
3.9

3.7
4.9

5.0
5.4

Notes: 1. Survey results are scaled from 0 (least favorable to FDI) to 10 (most
favorable to FDI).
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2. Latin American column represents the average for the seven Latin American
economies.
3. Asian column represents the average for China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand.
Source: International Finance Corporation. (1998). Is Latin America number one
again with U.S. multinationals? FDI News, available on the Internet
at http://www.ifc.org/PUBLICAT/FDINEWS/VOL21/P3.htm.
Appendix 4
1999 International Corruption Perception Index
Country
Rank
1
2
3
5
7
8
9
11
12
13
14
15
17
18
19
20
21
22
24
25

Country

Denmark
Finland
New Zealand
Sweden
Canada
Iceland
Singapore
Netherlands
Norway
Switzerland
Luxembourg
Australia
United Kingdom
Germany
Hong Kong
Ireland
Austria
USA
Chile
Israel
Portugal
France
Spain
Botswana
Japan
Slovenia
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27
28
29
31
32
34
36
38
39
40
41
43
44
45

49
50
53
54
56
58

63

68
70

Estonia
Taiwan
Belgium
Namibia
Hungary
Costa Rica
Malaysia
South Africa
Tunisia
Greece
Mauritius
Italy
Czech Republic
Peru
Jordan
Uruguay
Mongolia
Poland
Brazil
Malawi
Morocco
Zimbabwe
El Salvador
Jamaica
Lithuania
South Korea
Slovak Republic
Philippines
Turkey
Mozambique
Zambia
Belarus
China
Latvia
Mexico
Senegal
Bulgaria
Egypt
Ghana
Macedonia
Romania
Guatemala
Thailand
Nicaragua
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71
72
74

80
82
84
87
90
93
94
96
98
99

Argentina
Colombia
India
Ivory Coast
Moldova
Ukraine
Venezuela
Vietnam
Armenia
Bolivia
Ecuador
Russia
Albania
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Republic
Pakistan
Uganda
Kenya
Paraguay
Yugoslavia
Tanzania
Honduras
Uzbekistan
Azerbaijan
Indonesia
Nigeria
Cameroon

Source: Transparency International, Press Release: New Poll Shows Many Leading
Exporters Using Bribes, October 26, 1999.
Note: To read this table, #1 country is perceived to be the Least Corrupt and as you
move down the list to #99 the perceived level of Corruption increases.
1. 1Primary contact person for this manuscript.

Mountain Plains Journal of Business and Economics, Volume 1, 2000

